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DRAFT BRIEFING  
GODFREY TO McCONE

6 July 1966

Yugoslavia: Party Problems

and President Tito by forcing his top lieutenant/heir apparent, Alexander Rankovic, to resign has set in motion the most drastic shake-up of the Yugoslav regime since 1954.

Tito's action against his long-time colleague and old comrade, apparently taken reluctantly, was the first step in what will probably be a wide ranging purge of those who have opposed implementation of economic and social reforms.

Tito apparently became alarmed at some of the activities and methods Rankovic was using to widen his power base in the regime.

Rankovic's ouster at a 1 July party meeting was based on charges that he had misused his influence over the secret police to oppose regime policies and to enhance his power in the regime.

Although Rankovic has in the past carefully hidden his opposition to the reforms, his use of the secret police to hinder their implementation apparently became so serious that Tito felt compelled to act.

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There were no indications that he was engaged in any plan to overthrow Tito.

Rather, Rankovic seemed to be looking ahead to the day when he would legally replace the 74 year-old dictator and was attempting to insure that his take-over would not be opposed on result in serious party factionalism.

The pending party shake-up will probably lead to a broad reshuffling of government and party officials and the ouster of conservative elements who shared Rankovic's outlook. Younger and generally more liberal party officials will probably be brought into positions of authority.

The 1 July party meeting which forced Rankovic's resignation also established a powerful 40-man commission--it is to make recommendations for reorganization of the party at both national and republic levels.

Any such wide scale shake-up of the party is likely to exacerbate existing nationality rivalries, particularly between the Serbs and Croats.

Rankovic's essentially conservative outlook had backing from his fellow Serbian communists who resented the regime's economic policies that benefited the more developed republics of Croatia and Slovenia.

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The ouster of Rankovic and the pending party shake-up throw into doubt the entire question of Tito's successor.

Neither of the two remaining party secretaries, Kardelj and Vlahovic, have a strong power base in the party.

In addition two possible new challengers have already appeared--Crvenkovski who chaired the party commission that investigated Rankovic and Todorovic who has been elevated to replace Rankovic in the party.

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Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact summit meeting which opened in Bucharest on 4 July culminates a long series of lower level pact meetings that started last winter.

They were devoted apparently to dealing with conflicting views about the pact's structure and Russian attempts to introduce greater cohesion into the pact's machinery.

The Rumanians regarded the Russian plans as a danger to their freedom of maneuver and a threat to their hard won independence in bloc affairs.

They were apparently successful in getting Moscow to modify its position during a two week long meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in late June.

Though never openly expressed, some of the other Eastern European countries were probably just as anxious to preserve their freedom of maneuver and at least implicitly supported the Rumanians.

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Various reports allege that the Rumanians proposed the pact's chief military post be rotated among the member states and that all members be given a voice in any decision to use Soviet nuclear weapons.

Moscow evidently was able to turn aside these obviously unacceptable counter-motions only by modifying some of its own positions.

In any event the Foreign Ministers' meeting ended with an announcement that the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact--its highest political organ--was to meet in Bucharest in early July.

This suggested that enough common ground had been found to proceed with a meeting--and Rumania's foreign minister indicated on his return from Moscow that he was not at all dissatisfied with the results.

Brezhnev in his recent talks with De Gaulle reportedly emphasized the Bucharest meeting would be rather routine.

However, last minute snags seem to have developed.

Our Embassy in Bucharest believes some continuing differences remain to be ironed out.

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Western newsmen report that the Soviet and Rumanian leaders met privately for three hours on 4 July and appeared unusually serious when they parted.

Subsequently on 6 July Brezhnev held a separate short discussion with the Polish and Hungarian leaders following a formal Pact meeting in the morning.

According to a brief Moscow communique issued 6 July at the conclusion of the three day Political Consultative Committee meeting the member states "unanimously <sup>adopted</sup> endorsed;"

1. A declaration on peace and security in Europe; and
2. A declaration on "the US aggression in Vietnam."

The texts of both these declarations will be published according to the communique.

Among other matters possibly discussed by the Political Consultative Committee were;

1. Changes in the structure and organization of the pact; and
2. Plans for a modest reduction of Soviet troops in East Germany.

The pact meeting is to be followed immediately by a top level CEMA meeting in Bucharest.

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[Redacted]

6 July 1966

De Gaulle's 20 June to 1 July visit to the USSR went  
as predicted in terms of practical accomplishments and non-accomplishments. On key European political issues both sides apparently felt that the impression of movement toward detente with the USSR and France in the vanguard was the best that could be achieved.

On Vietnam, both sides repeated the standard call for an end to foreign intervention and a return to the 1954 Geneva accords as a basis for settlement. Kosygin but not De Gaulle referred publicly to the stepped-up US air strikes. French sources have indicated that there was no agreement to launch a French-Soviet "common initiative" on Vietnam.

The forms of future French-Soviet contact were laid out in the post-visit joint declaration calling for mutual consultations on bilateral and multilateral relations, the establishment of a Paris-Moscow "hot line", and the creation of a joint commission to oversee fulfillment of the two economic and scientific technical agreements signed during the visit. The frequency and level of the "mutual consultations" were not specified. They may include semi-annual meetings of the foreign ministers but they fall far short of the strict regimen of the 1963 French-German treaty.

The scientific agreement includes four substantive areas of space cooperation: (1) space research, including the

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
Soviet launch of a French satellite although important "technical" matters remain to be negotiated here; (2) space meteorology, including parallel launching of sounding rockets; (3) space communications, envisaging continuation of the Molniya satellite experiments; and (4) visits of French scientists to Soviet Academy institutes.

The Soviets displayed exceptional public cordiality and deference toward De Gaulle including an invitation--unprecedented for a westerner--to view an ICBM and satellite launching. At the very outset of their talks, however, General Secretary Brezhnev made clear that Moscow's position on Germany was not negotiable. He stressed the well-worn doctrine that there are two German states, and indicated that any discussions with the West on Germany would have to proceed from acceptance of that fact. The subject of a European security conference reportedly was raised in passing, but Brezhnev did not press it and he gave the impression that the Soviets did not consider such a conference near at hand.

De Gaulle probably views the visit as a success in placing France in the forefront of those nations seeking a European settlement. Despite some acknowledgement that the US has a role to play in that settlement, De Gaulle probably believes that he has taken a significant step toward the day when that settlement can be primarily the work of the European themselves.

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De Gaulle's visit may encourage other Western European states to open bilateral dialogs with Moscow.

By sticking to a firm position on Germany, De Gaulle was careful not to isolate himself from his West European partners and to portray himself as an astute European leader who would not be taken in by the Soviets.

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